Letter to
320 West Temple St Los Angeles CA 90012 Sent via FAX 213-626-0434
June 30, 2009 RE RFS No 001494/EF892958
Mr. Wayne Crathorne has asked me to respond to your May 26, 2009 notice of claimed violation on his free speech sign located inside of his property.
When your department tried to attack his sign in 2006 I provided the Supreme Court case (No. 92-1856) to your department and the supervisor. The Court declared that a government agency cannot have a law that limits his right to free speech based on content. The case is City of Ladue v. Gilleo, U.S. (1994) Decided June 13, 1994 Respondent Gilleo filed this action, alleging that the ordinance violated her right to free speech by prohibiting her from displaying a sign stating, "For Peace in the Gulf," from her home. The District Court found the ordinance unconstitutional, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the ordinance was a "content-based" regulation, and that Ladue's substantial interests in enacting it were not sufficiently compelling to support such a restriction.
The US Supreme Court Held: The ordinance violates a Ladue resident's right to free speech.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. An ordinance of the City of Ladue prohibits homeowners from displaying any signs on their property except "residence identification" signs, "for sale" signs, and signs warning of safety hazards. The ordinance permits commercial establishments, churches, and nonprofit organizations to erect certain signs that are not allowed at residences. The question presented is whether the ordinance violates a Ladue resident's right to free speech.
(a) While signs pose distinctive problems, and thus are subject to municipalities' police powers, measures regulating them inevitably affect communication itself. Such a regulation may be challenged on the ground that it restricts too little speech because its exemptions discriminate on the basis of signs' messages, or on the ground that it prohibits too much protected speech. For purposes of this case, the validity of Ladue's submission that its ordinance's various exemptions are free of impermissible content or viewpoint discrimination is assumed. Pp. 4-10.
(b) Although Ladue has a concededly valid interest in minimizing visual clutter, it has almost completely foreclosed an important and distinct medium of expression to political, religious, or personal messages. Prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or viewpoint discrimination, but such measures can suppress too much speech by eliminating a common Page II means of speaking. Pp. 10-13.
(c) Ladue's attempt to justify the ordinance as a "time, place, or manner" restriction fails because alternatives such as handbills and newspaper advertisements are inadequate substitutes for the important medium that Ladue has closed off. Displaying a sign from ones' own residence carries a message quite distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by other means, for it provides information about the speaker's identity, an important component of many attempts to persuade. Residential signs are also an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication. Furthermore, the audience intended to be reached by a residential sign - neighbors - could not be reached nearly as well by other means. Pp. 13-14.
(d) A special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been part of this Nation's culture and law, and has a special resonance when the government seeks to constrain a person's ability to speak there. The decision reached here does not leave Ladue powerless to address the ills that may be associated with residential signs. In addition, residents' self-interest in maintaining their own property values and preventing "visual clutter" in their yards and neighborhoods diminishes the danger of an "unlimited" proliferation of signs. Pp. 15-16.
Mr. Crathorne fully believed his sign conformed to the law and we understand the matter was dropped in 2006. In reviewing section 22.52.940 (C) we believed the sign was located far enough from the highway line to conform to the law.
You have parenthetically added "front property line" which is not within the text of your ordinance. We can only assume that you have legal authority to modify the county ordinance to change the interpretation of the setback from the road line to the property line. We would appreciate a written copy of the source of your authority to change the interpretation of the written code.
But because Mr. Crathorne is a law-abiding citizen and resident of Agua Dulce, before the 30 day period expired he moved the sign to 12 feet from the property line. In reviewing the code, we've also determined that since his property exceeds 100 feet frontage, he is permitted a 96 ft.² sign. He fully intends to enlarge his free speech sign to 96 ft.².
It is fascinating to note that it appears you are only attacking his sign based on its anti-airport content. I am enclosing photos of two signs that are pro-airport. The first is fully located in the road right-of-way and the second is on the outside of the fence which would be within the road right-of-way. The first sign is also illuminated in violation of the code. These signs were located on properties in the same zone adjacent to his.
I believe Mr. Crathorne has an opportunity to make a complaint on content related enforcement against your department unless you immediately and accurately enforce all the restrictions on all R-3 zoned areas in Agua Dulce.
We are also demanding, under the Public Records Act, copies of all complaint letters, internal and external correspondence concerning this sign case in your department. You may of course redact the complaint letters to remove personal information.
Please send them to my address on the letterhead. Charles Brink Cc Mr. Crathorne
