MEMORANDUM
October 29, 1968
TO: 0. K. CHRISTENSON Director of Planning
FROM: JOE BEN HUDGENS Deputy County Counsel
RE: Aqua Dulce Airport
You have requested an opinion as to the County's power to regulate Aqua Dulce Airport, which lies entirely within the unincorporated area of this County. This airport has been operated for almost ten years as-a private airport pursuant to the terms and conditions of a special use permit granted in Special Permit Case No. 1352-(5). Some of the conditions of the original permit were modified in Special Permit Case 1404-(5). The City of Los Angeles now proposes to lease the property and to operate it as a municipal airport, with greatly increased air traffic. Neighborhood opposition to the prospects of additional noise and congestion has prompted your inquiry as to whether the County may hold the City to the conditions imposed on the original operator of the airport or to some other set of restrictions.
By the terms of the original. special use permit, the permit was to expire on September 1, 1968. There was no modification of this condition in Special Permit Case No. 1404-(5). Indeed, the order of the Regional Planning Commission in the latter proceeding specifically reaffirmed the expiration. date by stating:
"All other conditions of this case shall be complied." with as approved by the Regional Planning Commission.
Therefore, the special use permit for the operation of the Aqua Dulce Airport has now expired. If the airport is to continue its activities under private control, it must apply for a new permit.
if, however, the property is leased by the City of Los Angeles and operated as a City airport, the County will lose all power to regulate airport operations.
'Article XI, Section 11, of the Constitution of the State of California provides ;
"Any county . . . may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not inn conflict with general laws.
Section 50470 of the California Government Code states:
". . .(A] local agency may acquire property by purchase, condemnation, donation, lease, or otherwise for the purposes of this article and may use any real property which it owns or acquires within or without its limits as a site for an airport."
A city is deemed a "local agency" for purposes of the statute. Ebrite v. Crawford 215 Cat. 724, 728-729 (1932) . The reference to 'this article's is to Article 6 of Chapter 2 of said code, which deals entirely with airports. Elsewhere in the same article, Section 50474 reads in pertinent part as follows:
"In connection with the erection or maintenance of such airports or facilities, a local agency may . . .(f) Regulate the use of the airport and facilities and other property or means of transportation within or over the airport." .
The Ebrite case, supra, held that the combined effect of Section 50470 and' 50474 is to bestow upon a city the extraterritorial power to regulate the use of a municipal airport lying partly outside the city boundaries. Nothing in the reasoning of the decision or in the language of the statutes indicates that a city has any less power to govern a city airport located entirely outside the city limits. The words 'within or without its limits" in Section 50470 are wt qualified in any way, and do not suggest any requirement that any portion of the airport: be situated within the city's corporate boundaries.
Even in the absence of Sections 50470 and 50474, we would still reach the same conclusion on the basis of relatively recent case law. In Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 1.77 (1956), the court held that a building contractor constructing a school building for a school district did not have to comply with the building regulations of the city in which the building was to be located. The court reasoned that the school district, like the city, was a creation and an agency of the state, and that two co-equal arms of the state should not have the power to regulate each other's sovereign functions. On similar facts, a later decision held that a school. district need not comply with a city zoning ordinance in determining the location of a future school site. Town of Atherton v. Superior Court 159 CaLApp.2d 41.7 (1958). More recently. it s been established that Los Angeles County, in erecting buildings within the limits of the City of Los Angeles, is not bound by city building ordinances. City of Los Angeles v- County„ of Los Angeles., 9 Cal. . 2d 624 (1965).
In 1959, in an apparent attempt to reverse the precedents of the Hall and Atherton cases, the State Legislature enacted what are now Sections 53090 through 53095 of the Government Code, requiring "local agencies" to comply with city and county zoning and building ordinances. For purposes of these statutes, however, "local agencies" do not include cities or counties. Ibid., section 53090(a).. Therefore, based on the Hall and Atherton reasoning, ` the City and the County are equal sovereigns; and neither may regulate the sovereign functions of the other. The Hall opinion, at page 183, distinguishes sovereign functions from enacting laws for the conduct of the public at large." Leasing an airport is not the same type of function as the promulgation of rules of conduct; rather it is more analogous to the construction of a building. The leasing of Aqua Dulce Airport by the City of Los Angeles would, thus, appear to be a sovereign function o f the City , not subject to County control. In this instance, our analysis of the judicial decisions leads to the same conclusion as our reading off Sections 50470 and 50474 of the Government Code.
We, therefore conclude that the City of Los Angeles, if it leases Aqua Dulce Airport, will not be bound by any attempted County regulation thereof,